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WILLiAm

VAN ALSTYNE*

The United States has an aged Constitution. In fact, among the world's
extant constitutions, ours is the oldest of those that are both written and
judicially enforceable as supreme law. Most Americans, growing up under the
presuppositions of how our own Constitution operates, may well assume that
it merely reflects a commonplace feature of government. But that assumption
is inaccurate. Even now, the world's general practice is contrary to our own.
Indeed, a great deal of our early constitutional law that is so much taken for
granted at home is more carefully studied in other countries that have only
recently modified their own basic legal arrangements in partial imitation of
the American constitutional plan. In India, Japan, and West Germany, for
instance, early American Supreme Court decisions (such as Marbury v.
Madison,' which confirmed the authority of the Supreme Court to refuse to
apply acts of Congress which in its view are not consistent with the Constitution), are studied with keen interest because somewhat equivalent powers have
been vested in their judiciaries only during the last forty years. 2 In England,
which even now resists suggestions to entrench a written Constitution or a Bill
of Rights, 3 the manner in which the United States Supreme Court has

historically exercised its stewardship in constitutional adjudications is also of
very modern interest. It fuels the English debate on both sides of controversy; 4
*Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. The Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law
was presented on Friday, March 18, 1983 at the University of Florida, College of Law, Gainesville, Florida.
1. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. Medicus, Federal Republic of Germany, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA or COMPARATivE LAW Fl, F3; Jeani, India, id. at 110; Noda, Japan, id. at J8.
3. Lloyd, Do We Need a Bill of Rights?, 39 MoD. L. REv. 121, 124 (1976). See generally
Griflith, The Political Constitution,42 MOD. L. RLv. 1 (1979).
4. The current law in England is still as it was in 1700 in this respect: "An Act of
Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd." City of
London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (1700). "In Britain, the phrase 'judicial review' is
merely a flattering way of describing statutory interpretation -the
judicial approach to
which it is confined by strict rules, though there are signs in recent cases of a more liberal
approach developing." Scarman, Fundamental Rights, The British Scene, 78 COLum. L REv.
1575, 1585 (1978). See also Karst, JudicialReview and the Channel Tunnel, 52 S. CAL. L. RLv.
447 (1980).
For a review of legal developments in New Zealand, respecting freedom of the press, see
EsSAYs ON HUMAN RIcHTS (9th ed. K. Keith, ed. 1968); Burrows, The Law and the Press, 4
OTAco L. Rav. 119 (1978). For a review in Australia, see E. CAMBMuL & H. WnrrmoRE,
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some influential persons utilize certain United States Supreme Court decisions
to illustrate the wisdom of providing similar protections in England, while a
larger number utilize other decisions which, in their opinion, show the unwisdom and untrustworthiness of such judicial power.
A great deal of the hesitancy in other countries to entrench within their own
government an independent judiciary with powers of constitutional superintendence such as those possessed by our Supreme Court, reflects an ambivalence still not entirely laid to rest even in the United States. Essentially,
it is an ambivalence that such provisions of fundamental law as are worthy of
being placed beyond simple majoritarian tampering in a Constitution must
necessarily be cast in language that nevertheless requires interpretation. But
insofar as virtually no amount of editorial precaution can fully ensure against
subsequent judicial misconstructions that may grow out of mere judicial hubris
(or out of impatience for appropriate constitutional change through amendment), there is an anxiety that entrenching fundamenmal law is not well advised. The judiciary cannot be trusted. The point is very old and equally new.
In England, it takes the form of doubting the wisdom of confiding to judges
a power to hem in Parliament by irreversible interpretations of proposed
fundamental-law clauses which class-biased judges might construe (or misconstrue) in favor of the propertied classes. It is a concern derived partly from
observations about the United States Supreme Court and its uses of the due process clause during the "Lochner" era, i.e., that period during which a very large
number of state statutes were held invalid as depriving entrepreneurs of
"liberty" of "property" without "due" process. 5 In the United States, it is
equally well represented at the other extreme by the arguments of Alexander
Hamilton who dismissed the desire to include a Bill of Rights within the proposed Constitution of 1787. Here, the objection was that the effort would be
misleading and insufficient because, however a free speech or free press clause
might be framed, the definitional latitude available to courts (as available also
to Congress) would tolerate wholesale "evasion":
What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which
would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations
may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend
on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the
government. And here, after all, as intimated upon another occasion,
must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights.
FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA (1973). See also Hunt & McCarthy, Why No First Amendment? The
Role of the Press in Relationship to Justice, in AM./Ausm./N.Z. L. 133, 147 (1980).
The background to the newly entrenched Canadian Bill of Rights is presented in TarnopoIsky, The Historical and Constitutional Context of the Proposed Canadian Charter of

Rights and Freedom, 44 LAW

8C

CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (1981), and an assessment of the most

recent changes are presented in Reshaping Confederation: The 1982 Reform of the Canadian
Constitution, 45 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 1 (1983).
5. The reference is, of course, to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The large

number of related decisions are summarized in B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 173-75 (1942) and in the Constitution of the United States (G.P.O. 1972).
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 514-15 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). For a modern
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Nonetheless, at the time Hamilton expressed his own skepticism, the more
moderate optimism shared by both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison prevailed, although each readily conceded the inconclusiveness of a Bill of Rights.
Indeed, their own observations were extremely measured. Jefferson suggested:
The declaration of rights, is, like all other human blessings, alloyed with
some inconveniences, and not accomplishing fully its object.... But
though it is not absolutely efficacious under all circumstances, it is of
great potency always, and rarely inefficacious. A brace the more will often7
keep up the building which would have fallen, with that brace the less.
Similarly, writing to Jefferson less than a year before he introduced into
Congress his own draft of a Bill of Rights, Madison quite mildly observed: "I
have favored it because I suppose it might be of use, and if properly executed
could not be of disservice." 8 Addressing the House of Representatives, Madison
reflected the same sensible diffidence:
I will own that I never considered this provision so essential to the
Federal Constitution as to make it improper to ratify it, until such an
amendment was added; at the same time, I always conceived, that in a
certain form, and to a certain extent, such a provision was neither improper nor altogether useless. 9
Then, adverting to the expectation of judicial responsibility to apply the proposed Bill of Rights in the normal course of adjudication, Madison noted: "If
they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice
10
will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of these rights."'
Madison's own notes, jotted down to guide him in this extemporaneous address
in Congress, summed up the matter: "Bill of Rights - useful not essential .... "I'
These were modest and quite unexceptionable expectations. They did not
view that Hamilton may have been correct in his skepticism, see Kurland, The Irrelevance
of the Constitution:The First Amendment's Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press Clauses,

29 DPAxE L. R V.1, 5-6 (1979-80). And for more general statements respecting the ultimate
undependability of judicial review to secure the Bill of Rights, see, e.g., R. JAcKSON, T1E
SuPREME CouRT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 80 (1955) ("I know of no modem
instance in which any judiciary has saved a whole people from the great currents of intolerance, passion, usurpation, and tyranny which have threatened liberty and free institutions.'); THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189 (. Dillard, ed.
1953) ("I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon
laws and upon courts.").
7. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, from Paris (Mar. 15, 1789), reprinted
in part in THE LIE AND SELECTED WRMNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 462, 462-63 (A. Koch &
W. Peden eds. 1944).
8. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in V Tim
W-rINGs OF JAMES MADISON 269, 271 (G. Hunt ed. 1904) [hereinafter cited as V JAMES
MADISON].

9. Address by James Madison before the United States House of Representatives (June 8,
1789), reprinted in id. at 870, 880.

10. Id. at 370, 385.
11. Id.at 370,889.
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dwell upon extraordinary notions of judicial review, but here, as elsewhere
(e.g., The Federalist Papers 12), they treat judicial review quite matter of factly.
The marginal uncertainties of the Bill of Rights were taken for granted. The
assumption that judges would nonetheless feel bound to apply its provisions
as superior law is seen as no anomaly, but rather as a useful device. The
attitudes expressed are those of reasonable optimism and not of either naivet6
or fear.
Today, however, things are much changed. Two centuries of constitutional
adjudication have produced a greying of the Constitution and an uneasiness
respecting the interpretive predilections of our own Supreme Court that makes
its imitation abroad problematic and amendment here at home discouragingly
difficult. My own sense of the ill-fated Equal Rights Amendment,

3

for in-

stance, is that it became a casualty to the apprehensions of persons who frankly
feared not what it said, but how it might be judicially construed. My best
impression of efforts in England to secure an equivalent, enforceable Bill of
Rights in that country is that the task has been made much more difficult,
rather than more likely, because of our experience. I also think that a great
deal of this is due to the judiciary's own excessive ingenuity and to the misplaced wisdom that has urged upon the Supreme Court a variety of utterly remarkable views respecting the interpretation (and "noninterpretation") of the
Constitution.

12.

E.g.,

THE FEDERALIST

No. 78, at 485-86 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888):

The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and
validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to
be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.
See also materials and references in R. BERGER, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT (1969)
(while not useful as a source respecting the scope of the clause it purported to deal with,
i.e., the clause in Article III respecting "such exceptions" as Congress may make to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, is nonetheless a very full collection of materials respecting the widespread understanding that substantive constitutional review, incidental to
adjudication, would be a feature of the judicial power); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 15 (1962); Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the
Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. C(i. L. REv. 646, 655-57 (1982); Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide
to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 38-45.
13. Proposed by Congress as the twenty-seventh amendment on March 22, 1972, and the
extended ratification deadline having expired on June 30, 1982 (three states [of the requisite
38] short of ratification), the amendment would have provided:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
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I
From nearly the beginning, and certainly with the emergence of John
Marshall, "special" theories of constitutional interpretation have competed for
favor within our Supreme Court. In Marshall's case, it was the innovation of a
constitutional jurisprudence pursuant to which acts of Congress (other than
those affecting the judiciaryl)' 4 would not be subjected to the same judicial predisposition as acts of the several states. Rather, acts of Congress would be
treated as presumptively constitutional; 5 and only in the event that their
validity depended upon a manifestly unreasonable or virtually unimaginable
interpretation of some clause, might they be successfully impugned.'6 On the
other hand, no similar loose construction attended the Marshall Court's review
(and invalidation) of state laws in respect to those few constitutional clauses as
were addressed to the states.Y7
Still, despite his enormously impressive influence on the Supreme Court and
his remarkable thirty-four years of service, John Marshall could not live as long
as the Constitution itself. And predictably, the fundamentals of Marshall's
particular special theory of constitutional interpretation would not necessarily
be shared by the Chief Justice (Taney) or the Associate Justices who would
come after him. As the jurisprudence of Marshall's own special theory was not
fixed in the Constitution, nor was it by any means otherwise so persuasive that
none could give reasons to reject it, it could not last. Thus, it came to be dis14. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), it was obvious that several
plausible interpretations of those clauses in Article III describing congressional power in the
allocation and regulation of the judicial power, were available to sustain the Act of Congress.
See Van Aistyne, supra note 12, at 30-32.
15. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
16. John Marshall, it may be useful to add, had no difficulty concluding that the Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798, the first piece of national legislation seriously abridging speech, were
plainly constitutional.
17. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) ("contract" impairment
clause of Article I, § 10 interpreted to include legislative grant of land which a state was held
to have no power to "impair" by rescinding on grounds of fraud and corruption); Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (similarly activist interpretation of
contracts clause to invalidate state acts). For additional examples and an excellent review, see
generally Currie, supra note 12. The seed of the rationale for more aggressive review
of state vis-d-vis federal laws generally (both procedural and substantive activism), keyed to
a special theory of rationing the occasions and substance of constitutional review according to
the representative adequacy of the legislative source, appears in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
US. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). It was given a systematic push in an unduly famous essay by
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7
HAzy. L. REv. 129 (1893), once identified by Justice Felix Frankfurter as perhaps the single
most important piece of writing on American constitutional law. See also A. BiCKL, supra
note 12, at 35-40. The essential thesis similarly figures centrally in Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 CoLUm. L. REv. 543 (1954). An extreme version (literally removing
judicial review of any exertion of national power brought into question on the ground that
it exceeded any enumerated or implied power) is proposed in J. CaoreR, JuDIIAL REVIEW Am
TI= NATIONAL PoLricAL PRocass 175 (1980) ("The federal judiciary should not decide
constitutional questions respecting the ultimate power of the national government vis-i-vis
the states.').
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placed by quite a different theory -one not at all consistent with Marshall's
views.18
From that time to this time has, in turn, been quite a long time. Other individuals, holding other strong special theories of judicial role and of constitutional interpretation, have had their own turn on the Court.-9 Each, moreover, has drawn varying measures of extraordinary encouragement from very
able and occasionally very zealous American scholars. And some, noting the
lack of compunction of their predecessors who presumed to proceed by very
different theories than those who preceded them, felt correspondingly at ease in
doing likewise. And so things have gone.
Within the span of any one generation, the appearance and the dominance
of some special theory need not particularly have mattered. For within a
given period, an established judicial predisposition may well become "normal,"
i.e., it may become standard and, in some sense, thus also become correct. Even
between two generations, each reflecting quite a different judicial predisposition
toward constitutional interpretation, the sense of consternation need not be
great. Insofar as the decisional consequences of one Supreme Court's interpretative orientation may well have become politically resented, a shift in the
doctrinal vagaries of the next Court, albeit in fact a shift to yet another nonneutral position, would not necessarily be seen as such. Rather, it might be
(mis)understood as merely providing a welcome corrective of the perceived
hubris or error of the immediately preceding Court.
But it is an inevitable consequence of having an aging Constitution that it
exhibits these practices over a very long span of time. And therein is the rub.
Over two centuries, the precedents of previous adjudications accumulate. The
early cases, under John Jay or John Marshall, were not disadvantaged by the
geriatrics of accumulated precedent. Increasingly, however, as the detritis of
past decisions mass like so many granular mounds, the piles of antecedent case
law confront each new Justice until the task is principally to account for the
prior case law and only incidentally, as it were, to interpret the Constitution.
The early cases arising under the Constitution tended much more strongly to
set down a distinctive jurisprudence. They read as one might expect constitutional law to read. The holdings were cast in broad, quite confidently asserted
terms. The opinions fastened on principal issues. The Court was infrequently
18. For example, it is plain that Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
written by Chief Justice Taney, does not proceed from an interpretative predisposition at all
like that reflected in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), in which Chief
Justice Marshall sustained an Act of Congress vesting four-fifths majority control of a national
bank in private shareholders and private directors, and holding that it was immune to the
taxation power of any state despite the absence of any provision in the Bank Act which
purported to legislate such immunity.
19. E.g., Mr. Justice Black's textual literalism was defended instrumentally as most
conducive to strong protection of civil rights. See Black, Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court
and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S, Feb. 1961, at 63; Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living
Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1963). His jurisprudence, however, often resulted in quite
the opposite application. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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divided, and the resulting doctrines were strong.20 In reading early cases, whatever else one might think of them, one felt that they had the feel of constitutional law. While there was in fact a heavy bias in the interpretive predilections
of the Marshall Court, still it had the enormous advantage of not having to
answer to the stare decisis legacy of two centuries of shifting schemes of predilection. Now, however, there is such an outstanding exhibition of special
interpretive preferences respecting predispositions of constitutional review that
it is much more awkward to maintain that it is this Constitution that is being
interpreted. Rather, it is more widely felt that one must ask: whose partial
jurisprudence is currently being applied?
Among the many varieties of such partial jurisprudence, examples and very
elaborate scholarship can be mustered to endorse quite a large number of very
different propositions, virtually as though each were itself prescribed in Article
III. The following is by no means an exhaustive list:
1. Acts of Congress shall not be examined for consistency with the
Constitution according to the same interpretive predilection as shall be
applied to such clauses that may restrict state legislation;2 and,
2. Acts of the national government which are challenged merely
on the ground that the Constitution- confides the power to perform some
act to a Department other than the Department from which it issued
shall not be examined at all;22 moreover,
3. No act of government arising from any source of government,
whether national, state, or local, should be seriously examined for consistency with the Constitution except to the extent that it results from a
process which the Supreme Court believes to be insufficiently democratic; 23 but
20. See Currie, supra note 12, at 647:
This was a time of vigorous affirmation of national authority and of vigorous enforcement of constitutional limitations on the states; a time of extensive opinions in the
grand style we have come to associate with Marshall; a time, moreover, of remarkable
stability and official unanimity ....The rarity of recorded dissent during this period
was so great as to be almost incredible by modern standards.

21. See supra note 17.
22. See, e.g., J. CHoPER, supra note 17, at 263 ("The federal judiciary should not decide

constitutional questions concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President vis-Afvis one another.').
23. To a considerable extent, the proposition is embedded in Thayer's rule which
obliges the Court to sustain unconstitutional acts of Congress not merely when challenged
on grounds of insufficient enacting authority, but also when challenged on grounds that they
interfere with affirmatively protected rights. Thayer, supra note 17, at 151. Relatedly, insofar
as John Ely endorses a tougher substantive standard of equal protection review contingent
upon the (judicially perceived) extent to which certain group interests are not given equal
dignity or respect within a legislative process, necessarily the idea is equivalently that no

similar conformity to the equal protection clause should be required insofar as (judges think)
other group interests are given sufficient respect in legislative processes. J. ELy, DrocRAcy
AND Drus-T: A THEORY oF JuDicrAL Rxvivw 146-65 (1980). The general reference for this
sort of thinking is a footnote in Justice Stone's opinion in United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). On its face, Stone's footnote was merely a justification for
proceduraljudicial activism. It suggested that judges ought to be selectively willing to take
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4. Such laws as may be thought to be representation-reinforcing for
neglected minorities shall in any case not be examined for consistency
with the Constitution by the same standards as would apply to other
legislation;24 on the other hand,

5. Such acts of government which, in the Supreme Court's view (as
informed by a convincing jurisprudence of moral philosophy) abridge
any natural right fundamental to persons, shall be examined with
sufficient scrutiny as is most likely to determine that they are inconsistent
with this Constitution;25 and finally,
such cases, and willing to take a harder look at them ("more searching judicial inquiry')
than other kinds of cases. It did not decide that such cases, upon examination, should
necessarily also result in holding the law invalid unless they satisfied a more exacting substantive standard of constitutional demand. The footnote was, however, developed into an
independent, sociological rationale for differentiated substantive standards as well. Most of
its favored categories are hopelessly far removed from the separate historical basis that
would reserve a unique standard for race-based laws alone. The conventional standard of
equal protection review is one that virtually no law can fail. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1972). For a few of the many lucubrations on Carotene Products' footnote, see J. ELY, supra,
at 75-77; Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUMt. L. REv. 1093
(1982); Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
24. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 23, at 222. See also Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse
Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723 (1974); Ely, Democracy and Judicial Review,
17 STAN. LAW. 3 (1982).
25. Critically reviewed in Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981), and in Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 359 (1981). For leading examples, see A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDIcIAL
AcTIvixs
(1982); P. BOBBirr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 94-97, 137, 144-45, 159-67 (1982) (arguing
for the appropriateness of "ethical" argument which, to the extent that it is distinguishable
from a liberal interpretation of particular clauses [e.g., the ninth amendment, the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment], proceeds essentially by posing broad
normative statements, eliciting audience concurrence that surely legislation inconsistent with
such statements simply must be unconstitutional, and concluding, therefore, according to the
ethos of the American polity, such legislation is indeed unconstitutional); Parker, The Past of
ConstitutionalTheory -And Its Future,42 OHIo ST. L.J. 223 (1981) (condemning the political
pluralism characteristic of process-oriented theory and advocating exposure of underlying assumptions made by the theory to strive toward more democratic approach); Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv.
278 (1981) (reprinted in M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHs 91,
97-102, 123 (1982)) (arguing for a "religious" function for the Supreme Court, i.e., an obligation to discover contemporary vital values as the ligaments that bind an enlightened society,
to enact them as appropriately protected rights); Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten
Constitution: The Problem of Change and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 295 (1979) (claiming a shift to human rights in constitutional development as
the underlying normative backdrop balancing stability and change in constitutional development); Saphire, Professor Richards' Unwritten Constitution of Human Rights: Some Preliminary Observations, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 305 (1979) (criticizing validity of Richards'
theory as failing to develop role of history in human rights paradigm); Saphire, The Search
for Legitimacy in Constitutional Theory: What Price Purity?, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 335 (1981) (exploring theories focusing on the process of decision-making and arguing that such theories
sacrifice constitutional moral function in serving society by subordinating concern for substantively "just" decisions). For related ideas, see C. BLACK, DECISION ACcORDING TO LAW (1981);
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HAuv. L. REv. 1
(1979); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. RaV. 703 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Grey I]; Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss2/1

8

Van Alstyne: Interpreting This Constitution: The Unhelpful Contributions of Sp
1983]

DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW

6. This Constitution shall be deemed to have enacted all essential
principles of justice, despite first impressions to the contrary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court shall hold invalid such legislation as convincing sources of moral philosophy persuade a majority of its members
are inconsistent with essential principles of justice, as shall they also
employ the judicial power to impose upon all levels of government appropriate enforceable obligations to insure to each person the material
conditions of justice.2G
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978); Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional
Values, 53 S. CAL. L. Rav. 703 (1980).
26. See supra sources cited note 25. See also Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 962 (1973); Michelman,
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Forword: On Protectingthe Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARv. L. Rv.7 (1969); Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional
Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659; Stone, Equal Protection and the Search for Justice, 22
Auz. L. REv.1 (1980); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and
Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HAxv. L. Rav. 1065 (1977).
27. The term "noninterpretivism" may not go back beyond itsappearance in Grey I,
supra note 25, at 703. The reason may be obvious. It signals a frank resolve to detach judicial
review from the Constitution itself by stipulating it purports not to be interpreting the
Constitution. It may say too much about the current condition of constitutional scholarship
that "noninterpretivism" is willingly adopted as a mode of describing one's own work in
constitutional law. If there were not writers who evidently welcome its fit, e.g., Perry, supra
note 25, at 278, one might have supposed that its use was limited and purely perjorative, a
mere epithet cast cruelly against a judge or another writer -a harsh opinion of their work
(e.g., that judge so-and-so rendered another "noninterpretation" of the first amendment in his
latest opinion). Compare the following comment by James White on these tendencies:
To say, as some do, that "we" ought to regard ourselves as "free" from the constraints
of meaning and authority, free to make "our" Constitution what "we" want it to be,
is in fact to propose the destruction of an existing community, established by our laws
and Constitution, extending from "we" who are alive to those who have given us the
materials of our cultural world, and to substitute for it another, the identity of which is
most uncertain indeed. In place of the constituted "we" that it is the achievement of our
past to have given us, we are offered an unconstituted "we," or a "we" constituted on
the pages of law journals. One can properly ask of such a person, and mean it literally,
"Who are you to speak as you do? Who is the 'we' of whom you speak?" To answer that
the new "we" is defined not by the Constitution we have, but by the Constitution we
wish we had, is no answer at all; for who is the "we" doing the wishing? In the new
world, who shall be king?
White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 415, 442-43
(1982) (footnote omitted).
Volunteers are evidently not in short supply. Having persuaded himself that "noninterpretivism" is inevitable in any case (see Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HAv. L. REV. 183 (1982)), Mark Tushnet presumes to respond to the unasked question:
When I reach this point in the argument
how would you decide the X case?"

.

..

I am invariably asked, "Well, ...

My answer, in brief, is to make an explicitly political judgment; which result is, in the
circumstances, likely to advance the cause of socialism? Having decided that, I would
write an opinion in some currently favored version of Grand Theory.

Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 411, 424 (1981).
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Of course, not all of these prescriptive interpretative and noninterpretative27
directives could be provided for in Article III, even were there a predisposition
to do so, for they fit together uncomfortably. It is true, moreover, that in fact
none of them is thus provided for,2s although each has been enthusiastically
endorsed and each, to some extent, has been acted upon to some extent by the
Supreme Court at different times.
There is, however, a cost to these things. The American model is difficult
to commend abroad when its career at home exhibits such a high degree of
unanticipated judicial plasticity. It has become increasingly difficult to alter,
moreover, when the anxiety of even marginal ambiguity in proposed amendments cannot now be answered as Madison was able to answer Hamilton's
concerns. We do not dare now to add the possibility of new troubles given
the troubles we have seen. Time may not always heal all things. In the aging
of our Constitution, time has tended to reveal too many things.
There may be, moreover, the additional misfortune of a negative synergism
at work in these matters - a long term effect that neither the Supreme Court nor
a majority of people would desire if either could control the matter solely by
their own action, but an effect nonetheless that tends to come from their joint
reactions. The Constitution is increasingly difficult to modify by amendment.
The difficulty is partly the consequence of mistrust of uncertainty, a mistrust
to which the judiciary has itself contributed by its endless, shifting quest
among special theories of constitutional review. The sheer greater unamendability of the Constitution in turn, however, reciprocally presses in on the
judiciary - that it must do its best to spin out additional, mutating "meanings" from existing clauses to maintain the contemporaneity of the (now unalterable) Constitution. If, for instance, it is no longer feasible for an Equal
Rights Amendment to be ratified, it becomes even more legitimate than before for the Supreme Court to construe the fourteenth amendment toward the
same end. And yet, since the judiciary tends to take this task upon itself anyway,2 9 what then does it matter that the Equal Rights Amendment was not
ratified, and who, moreover, could be confident of its interpretation were it to
be approved?
II
It is sometimes observed quite ruefully that were the first amendment or
the entire Bill of Rights to be freshly considered today, as though they were
28. Nor is there the slightest reason to think that any of these formulations would be
acceptable as a proposed, express provision for inclusion explicitly in Article III.
E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Brennan, J., for a plurality).
29.
See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Compare Van Alstyne, The Proposed TwentySeventh Amendment: A Brief, Supportive Comment, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 189 with Note,
Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84
HARv. L. REv. 1499 (1971). Others, unimpressed with the straining required to adapt the
fourteenth amendment to render superfluous any new amendment, nonetheless urge essentially
the same outcome via some other existing provision (e.g., the ninth amendment). Compare
C. BLACK, supra note 25, at 35 with Van AIstyne, Slouching Toward Bethlehem with the
Ninth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 207 (1981).
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not now a feature of our Constitution, they could not possibly be accepted.
Most often, the point is offered reproachfully to suggest that Americans do
not believe in these liberties as much as was originally the case. Possibly there
is something to that idea, but possibly it is much oversold. Rather, it may be
that we have been tutored to take proposed constitutional language much more
seriously, to parse each phrase, to imagine every possible nuance of each adjective or noun, and to treat the matter much more as we would treat the fine
print in the exclusionary clauses of an insurance policy, i.e., with fear and apprehension, rather than with hope and confidence. Very little in the Bill of
Rights itself could endure that process and, with all respect, the tendency of
the Court to superimpose special, or noninterpretive predispositions is certainly
part of the difficulty.
To be sure, given a certain view of judges, and given a certain capacity for
philosophic detachment, it may be feasible to dismiss these difficulties as inconsequential. If one imagines that enlightened judges can stay atop matters,
one may also suppose that their own ingenuity may be sufficient to "perfect"
the Constitution, however spare its actual provisions. Surely, this view is not
merely remarkably optimistic, however, but considerably silly. A wholly creative
Supreme Court could well have made an isolated provision in Article IV of
the Constitution (that the United States shall guarantee to each state a "republican" form of government) an ample text to have outlawed slavery, to
have extended the right to vote, and to have protected free speech as well. For
is it not obvious that no government can be genuinely republican (i.e., representative) unless it is a government of free people, sharing a common right to
vote, and fully protected in their freedom to express their political differences?
Thus the bare text of this one clause in Article IV can facilitate immense
good. A special theory of a constitutional role for courts would endorse it.
Accordingly, neither the first,30 thirteenth, 31 fourteenth,3 2 fifteenth,33 nineteenth,3 4 twenty-fourth,35 nor twenty-sixth amendment, 36 was important after
all. None needs to have "cluttered" the Constitution. Given suitable ingenuity,
perhaps the whole of the Constitution could be reduced to a single paragraph
and still not lose any of the judicial glossing it has received.
At the other extreme, there is the view that the judiciary ought never invoke
the Constitution as an invalidating barrier to legislation unless no amount of
ingenuity can plausibly free them from doing so, because judicial review is
30. "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press ...
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

31. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United
States....

Id. amend. XIII, § 1.

32. "iNlor shall any state ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. "The right ... to vote shall not be denied or abridged ... on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude." Id. amend. XV, § 1.
34. "The right ... to vote shall not be denied.., on account of sex." Id. amend. XIV, § 1.

35. "The right ... to vote ... shall not be denied ... by reason of failure to pay any
poll tax or other tax." Id. amend XXVI, § 1.

36. "The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older,
to vote shall not be denied... on account of age." Id, amend. XXVI, § 1.
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itself anti-democratic and to that extent objectionable.3z A recently popular
37. See Thayer, supra note 17, at 151. I characterized as "unduly famous" this original
and most influential article, in note 17. Perhaps I should say why.
With respect to the adjudication of cases involving challenges to the constitutionality of
states statutes, Thayer held that it was the duty of the judiciary "to allow to [the] constitution
nothing less than its just and true interpretation." Id. at 155. In fully equivalent cases involving acts of Congress, however, it was Thayer's view that the Court was emphatically not
to allow the Constitution anything less than "its just and true interpretation;" rather, it was
to allow much less than a just and true interpretation. The Court was urged to do so, moreover, whether the issue of constitutionality turned on an alleged failure of enumerated or
implied constitutional power vested in Congress to presume to do as it had done, or whether
the issue turned on the inconsistency of the Act with some positive prohibition in the Bill
of Rights. Thus, Thayer acknowledged that his proposed rule will operate against "private
rights" as well, though it has a "tendency to drive out questions of justice and right ...."
Id. In brief, acts of Congress were to be upheld and enforced by the Supreme Court unless
founded on a preposterous, rather than an erroneous, misinterpretation of the Constitution.
Moreover, even if the legislative record were to make it quite clear that Congress had in fact
never even considered the constitutionality of itsproposed action, Thayer urged the view
that the Court should nonetheless pretend that it had, pretend also that Congress treated
the issue (of constitutional interpretation) conscientiously, and pretend that Congress would
not have enacted the Bill but for a good faith belief in its consistency with the Constitution.
Indeed, even if the congressional record made it quite clear that Congress enacted the Bill
despite its own expressed doubts and in express expectation that the issue would be more
appropriately resolved in court, still the Supreme Court was to treat the Bill as (falsely) reflecting a conscientious debate in Congress and a conscientious conclusion that the Bill was not
inconsistent with the Constitution. See id. at 146 (dealing with the problem and airily concluding that "we must assume that the legislature have done their duty .... ").
Taken at face value, Thayer's "analysis" should produce Supreme Court rulings along
any of the following lines. None of them seems the least bit attractive:
1. The Act as applied in this case does not in our view rest within any enumerated
or implied power of Congress; moreover, despite the able argument by counsel representing the government whose views we have heard respectfully, we are persuaded that as
applied, this Act also abridges the petitioner's freedom of speech contrary to the first
amendment. However, as our view is not controlling, as Congress is irrebutably presumed to have concluded otherwise, and as its view though incorrect is merely incorrect and no worse, we now sustain the Act as applied; [or]
2. We hold that the Act of Congress as applied is not unconstitutional either for
lack of power to enact it or for conflict with some affirmative prohibition in the
Constitution (although, of course, this in fact is not our view); [or]
3. We hold that the argument respecting the unconstitutionality of the Act of
Congress is correct and has not been refuted, but since reasonable persons might
conclude otherwise we therefore hold the Act to be constitutional.
I think none of this would have been the least bit attractive but for the character of
practical results that the thesis was expected to yield; namely, that acts of Congress which a
conservative Court would hold invalid might, under Thayer's rule, be sustained. Of course,
that kind of outcome more favorable to Congress might well be desirable and defensible by
rules of constitutional interpretation eminently persuasive in their own right, yet (unlike
Thayer's rule) not in the least derogating from the independence of judicial constitutional
review. It requires no fictitious imputation of constitutional interpretation within Congress
(and no nonsense suppositions about either the representativeness or scruples of Congress) for
the judiciary itself to apply a rule of generous construction in respect to the enumerated
powers of Congress. The rule of generous construction, like Thayer's rule of "clear error," may
of course result in upholding more acts of Congress than otherwise might be sustained. While
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variant of this argument is that the Supreme Court should yield the "meaning" of the Constitution in such degree as the legislation under review appears
to be the product of democratic processes. One might reject the assumptions
of either argument merely on the practical basis that the Court (as well as the
Constitution) is on quicksand once it feels charmed by this advice. A majority
of people constituting a representative body at one time may be no less
genuinely representative at that time than a fully equivalent majority of another time, but with each holding a wholly different view of the power they
possess under the Constitution. Depending, then, upon the accident of the
substance of the enacted legislation, indistinguishable statutes (indistinguishable, that is, in terms of the degree of representativeness that secures them)
are identically "constitutional" though their provisions in fact may be mutually
exclusive of one another and mutually exclusive also in terms of their compatibility with the Constitution. In this fashion, judges have little to do other
than to be jerked about as mannikins, approving the "constitutionality" of
whatever is "representatively" enacted, and reviewing seriously only "unrepresentative" enactments.
Additionally, the proposition that the Supreme Court should vary the
substance of constitutional clauses depending upon its view of the "representativeness" of the particular legislation at issue in the case, is subject to the
serious objection that it imputes to the Court an obligation it has no professional competence to discharge. Its "judgments" in this area are unlikely to be
sophisticated, 8 its outcomes will be correspondingly eccentric, and its reasoning tends ultimately to exhibit a built-in circularity.
Sometimes, the object of "representativeness" inquiry is the electoral
representativeness of the office holder or law-making body whose act or practice
is in constitutional question.3 9 The notion is that the wider the electoral
not free from criticism on its own account (federalism critics will tend to fault it), it is not
contingent upon doubtful assumptions respecting the capacity of the President or the
Congress fairly to assess the scope of their respective powers for the purpose of binding courts
as well. Neither does it make any assumptions (irrebuttable or otherwise) that the President
or Congress actually made such an inquiry before acting, or acted only after conscientious
anguishing. Certainly it does not invite a tendency to ration the independence of judicial review inversely to the degree of consideration that those departments may have given the
matter. In brief, there is no renunciation of independent judicial review, and no subordination
of the Court's own view of the "just and true" interpretation of the Constitution according
to the politically-driven and self-serving rhetoric of the political departments.
88. An example is readily furnished by Justice Brennan's opinion in Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 US. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting), in
which the analysis based on representativeness jurisprudence is either clearly unsophisticated
or seriously disingenuous. Compare the opinion in the same case by Justice Powell. Id. at 265.
See also Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U.

Cm. L. REv. 775, 800-02 (1979).
39. For a discussion and interesting case review applying this point of view, see C. BLAcx,
STRucrURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTrrUTIoNAL LAW 76-95 (1969). According to this view,
the degree of "presumption of constitutional validity" will move from zero in the case of an
individual police officer's on-the-spot decision to take certain action (which is subsequently
challenged) through "1" when the officer acted pursuant to a (mere) local ordinance adopted
by a city council through "8" when anchored in ? cearly-framed state law, through "8" when
in the form of a clear Act of Congress,
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auspices of the source of "law" drawn into question, the greater the demonstration must be of its degree of inconsistency with the clause or combination of
40
clauses pursuant to which it is challenged.
Sometimes, the object of "representativeness" will instead focus on the
breadth of the electoral base composed by the enacting body to suggest the
substantive validity of an acL subsequently challenged in an appropriate case
on grounds of alleged substantive constitutional inconsistency. If, however, the
ambient legislative circumstances suggest to the Court that the majority of
legislators, and those whom they represent, may be indifferent to the proposed
Act (for instance, the Act would have no immediate implications for them
[except, of course, as a legislative precedent]), then the datum that the Act
will not in fact have a broad field of application is deemed to undermine the
integrity of its "representative" auspices such that a lesser degree of constitutional inconsistency should suffice to have the Court hold that it is unconstitutional. 41
A variation of this second approach then closes the gap by becoming
circular. If, though an Act emerges under electorally-representative auspices
(e.g., Congress rather than an individual police officer), and though it will
affect a majority of all persons in all regions of the country alike, to the
extent that members of the Court surmise from the content of the Act that it
cannot be authentically representative (because to the Court's satisfaction such
an Act could not have been passed if it were "authentically" representative),
then it is stripped of any presumption of substantive constitutional consistency
and, indeed, is presumed not to satisfy the clause invoked to question it.42
40. Note, then, that what would be "held" unconstitutional when reflected merely in the
practice of a given police officer may (and sometimes must) logically be "held" constitutional
if reflected in a state statute, Of course, that inconsistency could be avoided by treating the
first decision on the merits as a binding precedent (though by hypothesis the "first decision"
itself would have been different had that "first decision" involved a state statute [or federal
statute] rather than an individual police officer's act)- but this way of coping with inconsistency then makes the content of the prevailing constitutional rule very much the accident
of which kind of "case" happened to be adjudicated first. How very strange. One may attempt other permutations, but most will be found to exhibit similar difficulties. The point
illustrated here is distinct from the different point discussed in note 43, infra, in the example
taken from South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Rather, it is a more general
form of the example (infra note 42) taken from Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
41. But see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), yielding to Congress the determination of what kinds of state legislative distinctions are forbidden by the equal protection
clause, though the provisions of the Act in question affected a very limited portion of the
nation and in fact received virtually no attention in Congress. A refinement to this approach
would qualify it, however, by reinstating the nearly insurmountable presumption of substantive constitutional consistency insofar as the Court is of the view that, despite the regional or
otherwise restricted field of impact of the proposed Act, the economic and/or sociological
position of those to whom it may apply is such that their political influence with the legislature is "bound" to be substantial. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 711, 767 n.2
(1945); South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938).
42. Legislation unfavorable to women is treated generally in this respect, partly on the
conjecture that women are (sometimes) not adequate to represent their interests because of selfvictimization of "stereotype," e.g., that they would have effectively acted to forestall certain
legislation, but for the damaging effects of our culture which precludes them from taking
their own constitutional rights seriously within the legislative process, and obliging the
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The circle is closed by generalizing this last analysis: such legislation as
certain Justices believe to be "unjust" can never be representative since by
definition authentically representative bodies could not have enacted it had
43
they been duly considerate of what they were doing (i.e., duly representative).
Thus, every "unjust" law carries no presumption of representativeness and
Court to do so in their behalf. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973).
Compare discussion in J. ELY, supra note 23, at 166-69 with Note, supra note 29, at 1505 n.48.

Legislation favorable to women may likewise be treated the same way, insofar as the same
school of political sociology can persuade some Justices that such legislation, unfavorable to
men, is only seemingly unfavorable to men (but actually favorable to them [in the Court's
view] insofar as it is favorable to women in respect to some reinforcement of "woman's role').
See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. of Women v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3339 (and compare the dissent
at 3347) (1982); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 220 n.2
(1976).
43. This use of representativeness jurisprudence in the rationing of substantive judicial
activism should also be distinguished from the relevance of legislative facts in constitutional
litigation. See, e.g., Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REv.
75. The distinction is illustrated by comparing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966),
with South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). In the first case, Morgan, an Act of
Congress forbade the use of voter-literacy tests because in its view the use of such tests was
per se sufficiently unfair as to deny equal protection to such persons as could not pass them.
In the second case, South Carolina, an Act of Congress suspended the use of voter-literacy
tests in certain jurisdictions as an efficient means of enforcing the fifteenth amendment's prohibition against otherwise-difficult-to-detect racial misapplications of such tests by voting
registrars.
In South Carolina, no novel or different construction of the fifteenth amendment was
relied upon by Congress than the judiciary, acting independently, regarded as entirely sound
(and conventional). The question, then, was the sufficiency of the factual predicate relied upon
by Congress, the sufficiency of the "legislative facts:" i.e., was there sufficient evidence of
difficult-to-detect registrar misapplications of certain literacy tests to support Congress' conclusion that, given these conditions, the remedy it proposed (suspending the tests in jurisdictions in which less than half of the eligible-age population registered and voted in 1964, mitigated by a bail out provision), was legislation "appropriate" to enforce the fifteenth amendment's prohibition of such racial misapplications? The Court agreed that the evidence was
sufficient.
In Morgan, Congress presumed to legislate its view respecting the constitutional consistency of literacy tests and the obligation of each state to deny to no person the equal protection of its laws. The Court had previously held that there was no inconsistency between
minimal English literacy test requirements and the equal protection restriction on the
several states. A majority of the court nonetheless concluded that insofar as it could "perceive
a basis" for the contrary (legal) conclusion reached by Congress, it would yield to the reasonableness of that view. But see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
The implications of the Morgan case can, of course, be confined. See, e.g., Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War
Amendments, 67 MINN. L. Rrv. 299 (1982); Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due
Process and Equal Protection?,27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975). Nonetheless, Morgan does provide
a strong opening wedge for additional "representativeness" determinations as, say, that the
Court should similarly yield if it could "perceive a basis" for a (legal) conclusion reached by
Congress that two-month old fetuses are as deserving of protection as seven-month old fetuses
such that it shall be a federal crime for physicians whose medical practice may affect such
commerce as it is within the congressional power to regulate, or physicians either directly or
indirectly receiving federal funds, to perform an abortion resulting in death or damage to a
fetus more mature than sixty (thirty? ten?) days old. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113
(1973).
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correspondingly, no presumption of substantive constitutional consistency
attaches such that the Court should defer in the absence of litigation demonstrating a "clear error" (rather than a mere error) in the constitutional premises
of the enacting body.
The d6nouement of "representativeness" jurisprudence may ultimately
follow this form:
1. "Truly representative" legislation is not to be held inconsistent with
the Constitution merely because the Court is (otherwise) persuaded that it is
unauthorized or forbidden by the Constitution. Rather, such legislation must
be sustained unless premised upon a manifestly unreasonable interpretation of
that clause or combination of clauses that has been brought to bear on the
question;
2. "Unjust" legislation, however, is never "truly representative," because
legislation which is in fact "unjust" could not have been duly considerate (i.e.,
truly representative) in respect to those whom it affects;
3. Therefore, all legislation which (the Court thinks) is "unjust," is
stripped of any presumption of substantive constitutional consistency; indeed,
such legislation must be held invalid once shown to be inconsistent with what
is itself not a manifestly fanciful interpretation of that clause or combination
of clauses that has been brought to bear on the question.
- The simpler form is this:
1. Laws a current majority of this Court think are "just" shall (almost)
always be held to be constitutional, the Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding;
2. Laws a current majority of this Court think are "unjust" shall (almost)
always be held to be unconstitutional, the Constitution to the contrary not44
withstanding.
To foreign students of American constitutional government, the basic
objection itself must sound extremely peculiar. The international significance
of American constitutional law is precisely that the institution of judicial review is anti-democratic. To "reveal" that it is anti-democratic may sound as
though a shameful discovery had been made deserving of apology and atonement. In fact it is no revelation at all. It is seized upon with the same indicting
passion as though one were to read the Constitution for the first time and discover that several of its original clauses actually condoned slavery which, until
the investment of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, was entirely
true.45 Still, as in the case of the several slave clauses, the anticipated anti44. These uses of "representativeness" jurisprudence in adjusting the substantive standards
of various clauses, incidentally, should be distinguished from their uses in respect to procedural
(as distinct from substantive) judicial restraint and judicial activism. The 4,000 plus caseload
of the Supreme Court (the majority of which cases are on its certiorari, rather than its appeal
docket) obviously requires some rationing system in determining which cases to hear. The
tendency of judges to employ their own notions of political sociology in deciding which cases
to hear (e.g., because certain types of laws seem "fishy") may not be very sophisticated and
may, of course, engender its own frustrations. But it produces no important body of substantive constitutional law with the ramified inconsistencies and the sheet vagrancy of keying
the "meaning" of clauses to perceived "representativeness."
45. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (direct taxes shall be apportioned . . . by adding to
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democratic character of judicial review was no secret. Rather, it was treated
most matter-of-factly. And, unlike the slave clauses in this respect, it was not
defended merely as a necessary concession to secure ratification. It was defended as a positive good: the integrity of the Constitution would not depend
upon mutating impressions in Congress or elsewhere.4 6 Judges were not expected to "adjust" the meaning of clauses in proportion to the numbers or
representativeness of legislative bodies. The difficulty with the objection is,
therefore, that while its endless repetition has given it the appearance of profound insight, it may rather be set aside as altogether trivial.

m
Virtually discarded among the many descriptions of constitutional review
in the United States, in contrast with the many special theories, is the following description by the unremarkable Justice Owen Roberts:
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as
not conforming to the constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of
the Government has only one duty - to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide
whether the latter squares with the former.As a concise summary of the judicial obligation, Justice Roberts' dictum is
worthy of consideration despite the sophisticated criticism it obviously invites.
To be sure, its comparison of the judicial task with a mere mechanical exercise
may be subject to criticism; 48 the thought that the judicial task is as simply
done as laying down a T-square to see whether one line is perpendicular to another may itself not square even with an ordinary citizen's impression of the
difficulty, to say nothing of those professionally involved in constitutional
litigation. But the suggestion that the judicial task of constitutional review
should be performed with the same undissembling interest in accuracy as one
would bring to his or her own work bench is, nonetheless, a proposal of
enormous and lasting appeal. In fact, it may capture more accurately than any
other single statement exactly what most people would hope for from the
Supreme Court.
The idea is indeed to see whether the two things, the statute and the
Constitution, square. If they do not, then the judicial task, which is to state the
truth, is not less well done on that account. The correction of the line representing a statute that does not square is for those responsible for drawing such
lines. It is with Congress, not the Court. Similarly, the correction of the line
representing the relevant article in the Constitution is for those to whom the
the whole number of free Persons . . . .') (encourages slavery because congressional representa.
tion directly correlates to the number of slaves brought into the state); id. art. IV, § 2,cl.3
("fugitive slave" clause recognizing and enforcing slaveowners' rights). See also id. art. I, § 19,
cl.
1; id. art. V. See generally Trx CONSTITUTION, A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT (W. Phillips ed.

1845).
46. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
47. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 6, 62 (196).
48. See, e.g., A. Bicitn, supra note 12, at 90.
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responsibility is given for altering such lines. It is not the Court's business to
move it or to misrepresent its location from any presupposition of its own that
a different constitutional line might be better. The fact that the alteration of
constitutional lines (i.e., the amendment of constitutional clauses) is difficult,
has no bearing on the judicial obligation. If the means of altering constitutional
lines is thought to be too difficult to tolerate correct decisions, that observation
may propose a very good reason to alter the clause in the Constitution that
makes amendment so difficult. It proposes no obvious reason, however, for
judges to misstate the Constitution. The case to do so is no better than its
opposite, i.e., than justifications for a predisposition to find that a statute and
the Constitution do not square (when in fact the Court believes they do) because of antipathy to the statute or because of one's belief that Congress has
made an enormous political or moral (but not unconstitutional) mistake.
The Roberts dictum is sometimes brushed aside on the strength of the
suggestion that he did not fully appreciate that it is a Constitution the judges
are expounding in those cases, 49 and not merely some lesser thing as a statute,
an administrative regulation, or a trivial municipal ordinance. But this
suggestion is not at all convincing either biographically or in the abstract.
Explicit in the dictum is the recognition that it is a Constitution being expounded. Explicit as well, however, is important recognition that it is merely
this Constitution the judges are expounding, not some other.
If the Constitution contains clauses not always the most noble (as of course
it may), clauses that may weigh too heavily upon a judge's conscience, he or she
may reassess the personal acceptability of the judicial task. If the task of this

Constitution's scrupulous construction and application sometimes seems trivial,
demeaning or even pernicious, the private conviction provides a thoroughly
decent reason to find a career in something one believes to be less compromising and more ennobling. Short of entangling considerations that may sustain
acts of civil disobedience, 50 it provides no reason to refabricate the Constitution
or to misrepresent the statute. That it is a Constitution being expounded
readily explains why one should be especially conscientious about its determination; it warrants an exceptional willingness to listen, to consider, and to
be very careful. 51 That because it is a Constitution being expounded judges
49. The phrase is Marshall's, from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 316, 40607 (1819), in which the immediate point is that while the government "can exercise only the
powers granted to it," because "it is a constitution we are expounding," the "fair and just
interpretation" of those powers ought not be grudging. The same useful proposition is
asserted quite forcefully in a memorable Holmes' opinion a century later, as well. See Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The rule of generous construction of express national powers
is analytically quite different from a suggestion that an interpretation which the Court would
conclude was erroneous (though "merely" erroneous and not preposterously so) should nonetheless be applied for adjudicative purposes by the judiciary if the erroneous interpretation
is preferred by Congress. Compare supra note 37.
50. See J. ELY, supra note 23. at 183 ("At that point you'd hardly be acting like a
judge .... ). In which case one does not pretend to do one's duty, but rather declares why
one will not do so under the circumstances.
51. "[P]recisely because 'it is a constitution we are expounding,' we ought not to take
liberties with it." National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 647 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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should therefore feel more free than otherwise to fudge its interpretation, however, is a proposition that though argued often, has never been argued convincingly.
IV
Despite the straightforwardness of the judicial duty described by Justice
Roberts, headway against it has also been directed from quite a different
quarter than from those suggesting the Supreme Court should simply "adjust"
the Constitution to make it better. The Roberts metaphor, as already noted,
does imagine something like a T-square that judges simply lay down to see
whether a statute squares with the Constitution. If not that, at least it must
assume that "the line" representing the constitutional clause with which a
statute is being compared is reasonably obvious. (It may also imagine that that
line is not merely discernible, but that it is also fixed, i.e., that it does not
move from time to time, though the latter assumption is not critical to all arguments of this type.) In either case, "the line" representing the constitutional
clause must at least be reasonably discernible. Otherwise, whether with the aid
of a T-square or merely by one's own, unaided eyesight, it is impossible to
perform the judicial duty - to say whether the statute "squares" with that line.
In any event, this much is fairly certain: the less discernible the constitutional
line, the less possible the performance of the judicial task even as laid down in
the Roberts dictum.
The headway this sort of observation seeks to make against the conventional
description of the judicial task now becomes clear. Determining where the
line represented by a constitutional clause lies is in fact not the same as the
mechanical task of seeing whether one line "squares" with another. The
Roberts dictum takes for granted the obviousness of the line representing the
constitutional clause that has been invoked. 52 The task it assumes is solely that
of measurement, i.e., the determination of whether the two "square." But the
problem of judges is not principally that of measurement. It is rather, that of
interpretation. It is the problem of first deciding where does the constitutional
line lie? Redundantly, then, the task of judges involves judgment. The Court
must determine the meaning of words which in one moment seem plain to
one, plain but the opposite to another, marginally uncertain to others, and
virtually hopeless to still others.
Between these two critical sentiments, justifications for a great deal of
"meta" constitutional law have been proposed. For some, the Constitution is
only too clear in certain particulars, but the clarity it yields is extremely disappointing. The actual Constitution does not fulfill one's expectations; it does
not exalt what one hopes and it is not a Constitution commensurate with one's
notion of a Constitution as ideal norm. "The" judicial duty is therefore to adjust the Constitution by degree, to be guided by a meta Constitution superimposed upon the inadequate original, to bring it 'round to normative ma53
turity.
52. A. Bici, , supra note 12, at 90.

53. See supra materials collected notes 25-26.
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For others, it is quite the opposite point that the Constitution is insufficiently clear in nearly all of its most significant clauses, specifically its most
normative clauses such as the due process clause, the equal protection clause,
or the ninth amendment virtually in its entirety. 5 Accordingly, "the" judicial
duty is to impute some meaning without which the constitutionality of statutes
cannot be determined, and to impute that meaning according to some notion
of what courts might do that neither duplicates legislative processes nor leaves
these clauses virtually useless in litigation. 55
The consequences of these polar objections to the conventional view of the
judicial duty (namely, the objections that the Constitution is clear but inadequate and also that in its most essential features it is unclear and thus requires
improvisation) nurtures what is, perhaps, the majority of all academic writing
about the Constitution today. I confess, however, that I find very little of it
helpful and cannot make any productive use of either point of view. To the
contrary, I believe that most of it will eventually be seen at a later date as but
the academic residue of yet another period in which American constitutional
law records its native propensity for instability and rank politicization.
The first view (that insofar as the Constitution is clear but disappointing,
the appropriate role of judges is to make it "better" by reconstruction) is not
worth further comment. The second view, that in its most interesting features
the Constitution is just so indefinite that the Roberts dictum is simply not helpful (because, while the preference for a truthful construction of the Constitution is unquestionably alluring, alas it is frankly also sometimes impossible), is
not so lightly dismissed. Indeed, in part my own professional writings are but
an exhibit of the difficulty. Some of that writing deals with the speech and
press clause of the first amendment - an amendment to the Constitution unquestionably important and, on its face, of exceptional clarity. Yet, it is one
point of an attempt to take the first amendment seriously to induce a wholly
sympathetic understanding that conscientious interpretations of the first amendment do differ: that many of the problems of constitutional adjudication are
not imagined, that they are not contrived, and that they do not proceed merely
from judges who are ideologues. Ideologues and persons with hubris have unquestionably served on the United States Supreme Court. But discount every
decision one wishes to make on that basis, and decisions of exquisite difficulty
still remain in substantial number. The example of the free speech clause,
seemingly the clearest provision we have in the entire Bill of Rights, may
paradoxically serve best to make the point.56
Even so, while I think it entirely true that conscientious interpretation of
the Constitution is often a more difficult task than the Roberts dictum implied,
by no means does its problematic quality lead to a conclusion that failing anything fairly passable as interpretation, courts must improvise meaning accord54. See J. ELY, supra note 23, at 191.
55. E.g., id. at 87 ("The remainder of this chapter [actually, of the whole book] will
comprise three arguments in favor of a participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing
approach to judicial review.").
56. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REv.

107 (1982).
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ing to perceptions of some special role. The dilemma that is sketched that provides a legitimacy for courts to improvise a special role when interpretation
fails is not what it seems to be. There is no such duty-at-large and, indeed,
certainly no such imperative merely to decide every case on its merits.
If the meaning of a clause cannot be established without recourse to meta
constitutional appeals (or arguments of mere policy), that fact merely provides
reason and straightforward explanation of the judicial conclusion that the
challenged act of Congress cannot be said to fail to square with the constitutional clause invoked by the litigant who relied upon it. If all that the litigant's
own counsel has produced and all the outside scholarship that might be
brought to bear on the question still leaves conscientious judges honestly uncertain where "the constitutional line" lies, the uncertainty neither impairs
nor delays performance of the judicial duty. Rather, the entire matter is at
once resolved by a decision on the merits. The decision is that the litigant
has failed to show that the act of Congress does not square with the clause
that he or she sought to rely upon, and the challenge fails. The burden to
show where the constitutional line lies is not with the Court. It is with the party
who claims that the act of Congress does not square with that line. The Court's
duty is to entertain the claim, to be attentive to it, to examine the litigant's
basis for saying "the line lies here," and to see whether the statute squares
once the litigant has established where the line is.
So, for instance, the ninth amendment may not only be ambiguous on its
face, but of no convincing pertinence even after one's best efforts to make much
of it (though there is no reason, a priori, to take its futility for granted).,7
Similarly, the nature of the United States' obligation to guarantee to each state
a "republican" form of government may present a similar difficulty (though,
again, one ought not simply assume that it will).58 If, then, a state resists application of an act of Congress on the claim that the act does not square with
57. The suggestion that the ninth amendments adjudicative futility ought not be assumed in the absence of serious investigation is meant earnestly. Despite the criticism that has
been made of Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (see, e.g., Grano, supra
note 25, at 8-11), it may very well be an instance of a law which, as applied, was seriously
subject to objection on ninth amendment grounds. The case involved a zoning ordinance
applied to forbid a grandmother from sharing her own home with her own two grandsons;
the ordinance was applied despite the utter lack of any evidence of crowding, interference with
others, impact on property values, or any other distinction from any other family living together (as otherwise provided by the same ordinance) or, indeed, anything whatever that
should plausibly be disturbing. The integrity of ordinary families, the historical centrality of
close, consanguineal ties, the sense of duty and care of "one's own," the almost certain sense
of profound impropriety that (I think) research would show would have greeted the mere
suggestion of jailing an unoffending grandmother for sharing her home with her own
grandchildren, and the extremely well-developed paths of pre-existing decisional law absorbing
the presumed "right" to some positive sense of family, may well sum to a rare instance of a
compelling ninth amendment case. The ninth amendment need not be seen as an empty
sack simply from fear that unless one insists upon making it so, it must at once become every
judicial moralist's cornucopia. The burden would appropriately be upon Mrs. Moore to establish the foundations of her claim. In her case, however, it is likely that history would
support her very well indeed.
58. See, e.g., Bonfield, The GuaranteeClause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. Rxv. 513 (1962).
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one or the other of these constitutional clauses, of course the state may fail not because of lazy or careless counsel, but because, in the end, the best that
could be said was that the "line" representing either clause simply could not
be established with sufficient clarity to permit a judgment that the act of
Congress failed to square with that line. Nothing obliges the Court to improvise the line, to construct it, or to invent policies of its own which some line
might serve. Indeed, nothing entitles the Court to do any of these things. The
judicial duty is not less fitly performed because the party raising the challenge
fails. Neither was the party raising the challenge necessarily inadequate in exploring the plausibility of certain interpretations. The material was not there;
the clause was not helpful in the circumstances. The case is at an end.
It may well be that some clauses are not merely intractable at their edges,
but altogether intractable for litigant use. If so, it only goes to show, in a
practical way, that such clauses have proved to be unserviceable in litigation
before the Supreme Court. They need not, on that account alone, be thought
of as unserviceable in legislative debate, unserviceable for executive use or
unserviceable for each citizen's own private uses. 55 Rather, it may be merely an
unshocking example of non justiciability in the concrete sense. In light of the
issue before the Court, the best scholarship that the litigant could muster leaves
the Court without sufficient basis to hold the challenged act of Congress as not
squaring with the constitutional clause. Indeed, one might suggest that most
allegedly "nonjusticiable" clauses are not nonjusticiable in the sense that they
may not be a source of litigant reliance. Rather, they are nonjusticiable merely
in the practical sense that every effort to invoke them as a means to avoid application of an act of Congress has simply been unsuccessful: in a long list of
litigants, none was able to show the location of the constitutional line represented by the clause sufficiently to enable conscientious judges to hold that the
line represented by the act of Congress did not square. 60
Neither is there any trick or device to this treatment of the matter. To be
sure, this description of judicial review does involve a methodological premise
which is brought forward to resolve the putative dilemma, but the premise is
neither unconventional nor strained. The premise is merely that when an act

59. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), merely confirmed the separate
obligation of the judiciary to determine the consistency of acts of Congress with provisions
in the Constitution as an incident of adjudicating "cases" properly before the courts. Despite
a few pretentious dicta in other cases (see, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958)),
there is no basis in Marbury or in any other source for the suggestion that the sole "correct"
interpretation of the Constitution is that which is sufficiently convincing for courts to accept.
See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -CASES AND MATERIALS 25-30 (10th ed. 1980); Brest,
The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,27 STAN. L. REV. 585,
589 (1975) ("Decisions not striking down laws do not always mean that the laws are constitutional ... for a court's failure to invalidate may only reflect its institutional limitations.')
(emphasis in original).
60. The point is suggested in Justice Harlan's dictum that "[t]he suggestion that courts
lack standards by which to decide such cases . . . is relevant not only to the question of
'justiciability,' but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, to the determination whether any
cognizable constitutional claim has been asserted ... " Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 337
(1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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of Congress otherwise applies to define a party's rights, it is to be deemed
controlling in the Supreme Court unless the litigant is able to show that, as
applied, the act fails to square with some clause (or combination of clauses 1)
in the Constitution. The basis of the premise is more immediately the language
of the supremacy clause in the Constitution itself: the clause makes an act of
Congress the supreme law except insofar as not "pursuant" thereto. The burden
of one who claims an act of Congress applies to another is to show that the act
does so apply. If this demonstration cannot be made with the requisite clarity,
that party fails. In turn, the burden of one who claims that an applicable act
of Congress nonetheless fails because it does not square with the Constitution
is to show that it does not square. If he cannot show what the clause means, he
cannot show that the clause helps him and he fails.
Neither does this answer to dissolve the alleged interpretive "dilemma" of
the courts (i.e., the dilemma that allegedly compels the Court to improvise
meanings for constitutional clauses) depend upon one's agreement with this
particular methodological premise as a complete or as an exhaustive statement
of the matter. One may very well observe that, depending on the nature of the
challenge, sometimes the burden will be on the party who claims that the act
of Congress does square. Such an instance would arise when the challenge is
not on the basis that the applicable act of Congress is forbidden, but rather on
the basis that it was not authorized. It notes that only such acts of Congress
as the litigant relying upon them is able to show are "pursuant" to the
Constitution, can be the basis of enforceable claims - enforceable by the
government or by anyone else. Moreover, its burden-allocating premise is
quite unexceptionable. The express phraseology in Article VI ("This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land") straightforwardly supports
it.
Indeed, a fuller and relatively complete description, appropriately allocating
burdens in respect to constitutional litigation, will itself merely integrate
these several observations. First, to the extent that the government or a private
litigant claims that an act of Congress does apply to another in the manner
alleged, the burden is appropriately the claimant's to show that that is the case.
Second, one who claims that an applicable act of Congress nonetheless fails
because it does not "square" with the Constitution, must indicate in what
particular respect the act is alleged not to square. If it is alleged not to square
because there is no obvious enumerated power or combination of powers
sufficient to sustain the act in question, the burden appropriately becomes
that of the party relying upon the act to show that, to the contrary, there is in
fact ample authority to sustain it. On the other hand, if the objection is that the
act fails not for want of original power to enact it, but rather because other
61. The point of the reference to "some combination of clauses" is of course to
acknowledge that there is an architecture in the Constitution. The crowding clauses ob.
viously bear upon one another, their particular grouping in particular articles likewise may
have an illuminating significance, and indeed it may be useful to consider the "structure" of
the Constitution as well as the relationships of its features in the course of quite standard
and conscientious judicial review. See C. BLAcK, supra note 89.
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constitutional provisions disallow it, the burden of succeeding on that objection is equally clear; it is on the party who so asserts.
Thus, in a particular case the dispute might involve an act of Congress
that makes it a federal offense to cross a state line with the intention of inciting
others to riot. That the statute applies to the alleged conduct of the accused is
for the government to show. Should the act not be challenged as inapplicable,
but rather as beyond the constitutional competence of Congress, the obligation
is again upon the government - to show that the act was within the authority
of Congress to enact. Possibly the government may rely upon the commerce
clause (the power to "regulate commerce among the several states"), coupled
with the famous sweeping clause (i.e., the "necessary and proper" clause), but
in any event the burden is the government's to discharge however easily others
may think it can be carried. Separately, however, the party to whom the statute
is being applied may object that insofar as the statute means to criminalize
interstate travel when undertaken for the purpose of orally inciting certain
action by others, it is forbidden by the first amendment; i.e., it is an Act of
Congress abridging the freedom of speech, forbidden by that clause which says
that "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech." The
burden is, of course, upon the defendant to establish that the statute does not
"square" with this constitutional provision, and correspondingly to show how
this provision fits his case. In this instance, however, that burden may rest
upon him quite lightly in the first instance, for the language of the clause
itself may seem at once to address this case and the government may be ap62
propriately pressed to overcome the weight of the prima facie case.
Whatever one makes of these matters, they come to the same point. The
Supreme Court is not bound at all costs to invent some meaning for every
word and clause in the Constitution. It is, rather, to measure the adequacy of
that meaning or that interpretation tendered by some party to the litigation,
insofar as that tendered meaning or interpretation is relied upon to show how
an act of Congress does, or does not "square." Correspondingly, arguments of
constitutional meta interpretation that range beyond the assembly of materials
from which reasonable interpretations of constitutional clauses can be derived
are of no necessity whatever. Indeed, they are of no propriety. Noninterpreting
the only Constitution we are in fact expounding, namely this Constitution,
whether because one is disgruntled with its limited wisdom or because some
provisions are genuinely intractable, is not an impressive enterprise.
V
My consideration of how various judges and academics arrived at a number
of specific answers quite satisfactory to themselves, although emphatically less
so to others, was prompted by an attempt to examine several practical uncertainties of the first amendment 3 In nearly each such instance, it happened
62. "[The specific prohibitions of the first ten amendments and the same prohibitions
when adopted by the Fourteenth Amendment leave no opportunity for presumption of constitutionality where statutes on their face violate the prohibition." Letter from Justice Stone
to Chief Justice Hughes, Apr. 19, 1938, quoted in Lusky, supra note 23, at 1098.
63. This lecture is an adaptation of what will be Foreword for a brief work on INTM-IRE-
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that the difference in satisfactoriness was achieved by altogether subordinating
(if not utterly dismissing) the first amendment and by superordinating some
exceptional theory of judicial review. In brief, the recurring suggestion was that
the "right" answer to any vexing case arising under the first amendment (or
any other clause) is essentially a function of the "right" theory of what courts
should and should not do. Decide what courts should do and it will then be
obvious how the Constitution should be deemed to apply: it applies in whatever fashion as best fits what courts should do. On the foundations of that
truism, neo-creationists continue to reinvent the Supreme Court in their preferred image, principally as a means to reinvent the Constitution to their preferred ends."
Despite the problems of an aged Constitution, one advantage of having a
substantial history is that we may occasionally stand off from it and see what
we think it has produced. We have now seen the production of an amazing
variety of nonstandard theories of judicial review. They range from variations
on (a) - the Supreme Court should regard nearly all constitutional questions
as unwelcome and either decline to review them or failing that, uphold all of
the laws that it can, to variations on (z) - the Court should engage every dispute that even vaguely resembles a law suit to the end of enacting its own views
of justice. The intermediate permutations of nonstandard theory are numerous
and ingenious. They virtually exhaust the letters of the alphabet.
This lecture has dealt incompletely with many particular special theories.
For that matter, it is not even a full-dress, measured review of any one nonstandard theory. But the sheer gravity of the continuing discourse over such
matters, much of which is very ably discussed by other, seems still to have left
something out of account. Thus the point of this lecture is at once smaller and
larger than one will find reflected in the patient and even brilliant but ad hoc
pieces of special theory advocacy. It is to suggest that less has been accomplished
than meets the eye. It is also to suggest that the continuing pursuit of nonstandard theories does not now seem as promising as it once did, as an aid to
resolving the problematic quality of constitutional law. Neither does it appear
to be as useful as it once seemed, as a way out of uncertainty and of professional
discontent. Nearly all of it requires, moreover, some degree of playing very
loosely with the remembrance that it is merely this Constitution that is being
expounded. Principally for these several reasons, I think the historic quest to
fashion nonstandard theories of judicial review in constitutional cases has
pretty much run its course.
Yet, having reflected rather testily on why the professional tendency to press
various nonstandard theories of judicial review does not appear impressive after
TATIONS oF THE

FnIsr

AMENDMENT.

As a Foreword, its purpose will be to explain why the

ensuing chapters of the book will reflect no effort to resolve difficulties presented by cases
arising under the first amendment by recourse to any nonstandard theory of judicial review.
In brief, no first amendment issue would be "decided" by falling back upon some deus ex
machina that pleads to some special theory of judicial review. Not because no such theory is
available (plainly untrue) or because "none works," but because each requires too much
suspension of one's own grounds for disbelief.
64. The most recent prolix prolegomenon of this sort is elegantly represented in Unger.
The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HAv. L. REy. 561 (1983).
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all, one need not simply leave the matter at that. It remains to be said that
even if one cannot be won over to the particular rather automatic fashion in
which one or another special theory of judicial review tends to "resolve"
constitutional cases, one need not on that account lapse into a general professional moroseness about the condition or the liveliness of constitutional law.
Indeed, it may occur to one that in certain respects it may well be the advocates
of nonstandard theories, rather than their critics, who have been prematurely
pessimistic about the value of taking this Constitution seriously.
Ordinary judicial conscientiousness in respect to interpretations of our
Constitution cuts both ways. It certainly does mean that the boundaries are to
be respected, but there is no reason to take this as counsel of despair. The words
of the Constitution are instructive. They do impose constraints, equally upon
courts as upon other agencies of government. Yet one's own reading ought
not be close-minded nor premature. History, moreover, is germane in more
than a confining way. Quite frequently, what it yields is heavily dependent
upon the premises of its users -which may be far too narrow or wizened,65
rather than too wishful. More often than one might suppose, one may be surprised that what was first thought doubtful in respect to the manner in which
a given clause or combination of clauses might be applicable to a particular
case, is not such a puzzle after all. One may be surprised that an imperfect,
brief, and aged document, even absent those amendments one thinks would
significantly improve it, can still speak usefully to our condition, without need
to strain its provisions; yet I think it still does. 66
65. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). For significantly more perceptive treatments of the same historical materials, see A. BICKEL, supra note 12, at 102-04; J.
ELY, supra note 23, at 22-30, 198-201; Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955); Curtis, FurtherAdventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporationof the Bill of Rights, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982); Curtis,
The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 VAKE
FoRST L. REV. 45 (1980); Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist
Grounds, 80 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1982); Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth, 7 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1955); Murphy, ConstitutionalInterpretation: The Art of the Historian,Magician, or
Statesman?, 87 YALE L.J. 1752 (1978). See also materials collected in C. ANTIEAU, THE ORIcINAL
UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1981); H. FLACK, TE ADOPTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

(1908); J. JAMEs, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

(1956); Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 33.
An ironic effect of neo-cynicism in the uses of constitutional history is the manner in which
it furnishes argumentative fuel for "noninterpretivists." For example, a substantial portion
of Michael Perry's justification for superimposing a separate moral philosophy on the
fourteenth amendment is based on the threat that unless the reader is prepared to treat the
fourteenth amendment in this (noninterpretivist) fashion, the reader will be compelled to
accept the morally-dreadful consequences of Mr. Berger's "history." Instrumentally, such
authors may have a stake in agreeing with the bleaker reconstruction of history for the purpose
of persuading one that history is therefore intolerable as an acceptable source of constitutional
law. See M. PERRY, supra note 25, at 91 ("[u]nless there is a justification . . . for noninterpretive review in human rights cases, virtually all of the constitutional doctrine regarding human
)
rights fashioned by the Supreme Court in this century must be adjudged illegitimate ...
(emphasis added). For a similar example, see also Tushnet, supra note 27, at 781.
66. And to the extent that it may not, the means of legitimate fundimental change are
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If one works away at these matters more straightforwardly, moreover, one
may well be inclined to think back and wonder why there has been such an
enormous amount of peculiar energy expended on efforts to battle in behalf of
special theories of judicial review. Moderation leaves quite enough for reasonable people to think about, without the anxiety that the Constitution is subject
to capture by devices of special pleading. Give the document its due, and do
not fear so much for the rest.
still at hand. It is by amendment that a Constitution records a nation's fundamental changes
as an act of will, actively and positively, an observation that cannot be made of such transfigurations merely perpetrated by unimpeached and "not overruled" judges on the skeleton
of an inadequate document. By way of concrete example, it seems to me clear enough that
the amendments of 1791, and those also of 1866-1870, made our Constitution better by far
than what it was without those alterations. So, too, in this respect is it better by far were
those alterations not in the Constitution itself, but merely discoverable in the Shepardized
inventions of judges. So, as well, with equal matters of fundamental concern today. It is one
of the ironies of judicial self-jnstification that it operates to inhibit the nation's authentic
means of making improvements in the Constitution by (a) "proving" that amendments are
not needed and by (b) "proving" also that (given the special theories of some judges) none
of any significance can safely even be considered.
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